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Summary
The present size and projected growth o f British and French nuclear forces m the 1990s pose serious 
secunty and arms control problems for the Soviet Umon and the United States Either European nuclear 
power can now very likely and with more certainty m the next decade inflict intolerable damage on the 
Soviet Union even after absorbing an initial attack on its society As allies o f the United States both have 
an increasing capacity to pursue strategies favorable to their preferred interests and values at the poten nal 
expense o f American aims The arms control implications o f the British and French nuclear systems can 
thus be understood m a context o f multilateral deterrence as the bargaining framework within which the two 
European nuclear powers can be expected to assume a role either in resisting integration o f their systems 
into the present arms control regime deriving essentially from SALT I and II or as appears progressively to 
be the case in working to preserve what remains o f these accords and the arms process from which thev 
have flowed
The parameters within which the two European systems are likely to be integrated within a SALT 
START Geneva arms control process are defined by the current and future composition o f these forces the 
histone strategies pursued by diese states m creating a desirable multilateral deterrent environment and the 
domestic consensus on which their nuclear capabilities and strategies rest While both have adopted a 
posture o f minimum deterrence towards the Soviet Union each has followed contrasting strategies in its 
efforts to influence and inflect Amencan nuclear policies and practices the Bntish preferring to mtegrate 
their policies with those o f the United States within NATO the French to distance themselves from 
Washington within the Atlantic Alliance m order to maximimize both their independence and leverage over 
U S moves
In varying measure both Britain and France share several prerequisites that will have to be met before 
they will consider participation in superpower arms control talks (1) substantial reductions in superpower 
offensive nuclear forces (2) superpower acceptance of Bntish and French forces as strategic weapons and 
superpower recognition o f a unitary Eurostrategic and superpower nuclear balance and the concomitant 
multilateralization o f the nsk o f nuclear war (3) substantial reductions m Soviet and Warsaw bloc 
conventional supenonty as well as (add the French) chemical and biological weapons and (4) no substantial 
change in superpower nuclear defense capabilities
Recent trends in superpower behavior —  away from a negotiated nuclear environment to a 
unilaterally defined framework —  are creating incentives for a re thinking o f British and French pre 
conditions for arms control participation With the possibility of significant improvements in superpower 
nuclear defensive capabilities London and Pans are prompted to review their empty chair positions and 
assume a more active role towards arms talks just to preserve rather than advance what remains o f the 
current ragged and refracted arms control regime haltingly and erratically defined by the superpowers since 
the early 1970s and now under siege
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The Multilateralization of Defôrrençç and Arms Control
The military strategic arms control and political implications o f the French and British deterrent 
systems can be fully understood only if viewed as a reaction to the global confrontation o f  the superpowers 
ans mg from World War II and the subsequent evolution of the nuclear arms race between them. The French 
and British systems are dedicated to the preservation o f the survival and mdependence of their respective 
states and to efforts to influence the creation o f an international environment congenial to their interests and 
values Realization o f  these basic national and systemic objectives depends critically on the ability o f these 
middle range powers to manipulate their nuclear policies to shape the strategic and arms control behavior 
not only o f the announced adversary —  the Soviet Umon —  but also and no less vitally that o f  the United 
States the principal ally and major guarantor o f European security Thanks to the impressive growth and 
future enlargement of British and French nuclear capabilities deterrence and arms control bargaining are now 
fundamentally multilateral They can no longer be considered the exclusive preserve o f M oscow and 
Washington Superpower bilateral talks partially mask this strategic reality however much they may be 
justified by conjunctural needs and tactical considerations
This dual imperative of British and French nuclear policy—  to influence adversary and ally —  derives 
from the predominant but not duopolistic positions enjoyed by the superpowers in defining the global and 
regional security arrangements within which European political behavior must be framed- Deterring the 
Soviet Union is but half the problem What the United States does or does not do in extending deterrence 
to Europe critically affects British and French security interests and those o f their European partners How 
American deterrence policy is executed, whether in negotiating a stable nuclear environment with the Soviet 
Union and with its NATO allies through arms control accords or whether it is pursued unilaterally has
2fundamental implications for British and French policies and practice Any shift m U S  behavior has an 
inevitable if  not always an immediate and discernible impact on Europe s interests
British and French concern about American and Soviet security behavior would not be surprising 
even m the absence o f nuclear weapons The formidable military power o f the Soviet Union and the 
rebanee o f Western Europe on American armed might dictate strategies calculated to inflect superpower 
adversary and alhed behavior in desirable ways Favorable security outcomes are a function o f the moves of 
nuclear friend and common foe alike and their management o f their conflict These strategic constraints 
logically generate incentives among European powers to control or influence the behavior o f both 
supeipowers The ally may often be as troublesome as the adversary The perceived weakness or 
unrebabibty o f the United States —  a sentiment so much m vogue within European pobey circles during in 
the 1970s 1 —  or its purported destabibzmg behavior more recently noted by European commentators have 
been alternating w om es in trans Atlantic relations since the inception o f the Atlantic Alhance 2 Some 
Europeans believe furthermore that the Umted States is more a part o f the problem of European security 
than a solution to it  ^ Controlling Washington s behavior is thus considered as important to European 
pobey makers especially those managing the French and British nuclear systems as responding directly to 
the threat posed by the Soviet Union
The destructive possibilities o f  nuclear weapons and the enormous striking power m Soviet and 
American arsenals highlight these twin tasks —  as ageless as alliances between different pobtical 
communities —  o f simultaneously positioning adversaries and albes in preferred ways The modernization 
of superpower nuclear forces m train which will add substantially to their capabibties gives urgency to 
these strategic imperatives confronting European leaders The Soviet Union s theatre nuclear forces quite 
apart from its long range striking power threaten all o f NATO s bases and installations as well as the 
ground based nuclear systems of Britain and France Soviet capabibties include Backfire bombers 
thousands of tactical strike and air defense aircraft and surface to-air (SAM) missiles as well as SS 20 
SS-4 SS 12/22 SS 23 and shorter range Scuds FROGS and SS 21 missiles some o f  which are based in 
forward positions m eastern Europe Ensuring appropriate American support to balance Soviet forces 
globally and regionally and to provide extended deterrence that services European interests are indispensable
3ingredients o f  European security For the Europeans this has meant various combinations national 
(France and Britain) or allied through NATO o f nuclear response to growing Soviet nuclear capabilities 
within an arms control framework tied to SALT I and n  the central features o f the current arms control 
regime that moderates the superpower arms race while keeping open the possibility o f improved East West 
relations and detente 4
Maintaining a balance between alliance firmness and flexibility is fundamental to the European 
approach to the Soviet Umon and to the security role m which they would prefer to cast, and not fully 
successfully the United States From a European perspective a nuclear war whether initiated by the 
Soviet Union or incited by the United States particularly if hostilities are confined to the European 
continent, would be calamitous whatever or whoever was the source o f the eruption Precluding Soviet 
aggression influencing the evolution o f American nuclear strategy and arms control policies preventing a 
superpower arms race and war while insulating Europe from involvement m hostilities if  deterrence should 
break down have been driving aims in the development by Britain and France o f independent nuclear 
deterrent systems
What is o f  particular interest to this discussion o f the arms control implications o f  these two 
systems is less their s irmi an ties than the differences between them, especially with respect to the 
contrasting strategies pursued by both states m their efforts to influence U S and Soviet behavior The 
contrast is clearest toward the Umted States Britain preferring to get as close to the United States as 
possible France as far away consistent with the need for continued access to Amencan power on French 
terms The contrasting nuclear policies o f Britain and France capture Europe s conflicting approach and 
attitude toward the Umted States as guarantor power whose policies appear at different times to protect and 
to put Europe at risk The different paths pursued by Britain and France to influence Washington s security 
and arms control policies reflect, if  viewed as divergent tendencies o f a single European response the 
fundamental ambiguity o f European claims on Amencan power Part o f the purpose o f this paper is to 
explore the implications o f what might be characterized as a European strategy o f get away closer 
dependmg on the varying and not always compatible aims and interests o f the Europeans themselves 
particularly those o f  Bntain and France
4British and French nuclear forces those on station or being modernized are potentially powerful 
bargaining tools m shaping the nuclear environment, regionally and globally in prompting superpower 
incentives for catalytic warfare or pre emption m managing political crises and if war should erupt, in 
controlling escalation and facilitating war termination on terms favorable to the West As Andre Beaufre 
and Pierre Gallois foresaw a generation ago  ^the East West conflict has entered a period of multilateral 
deterrence as a direct consequence o f the expansion of British and French nuclear forces For different 
reasons neither superpower can be indifferent to the formidable destructive power that will be wielded by 
London and Pans in the 1990s European nuclear forces acting independently can visit intolerable levels 
of human and matenal damage on the Soviet Union The announced strategies pursued by Bntain and 
France and the necessarily limited range o f their military and, specifically nuclear options also potentially 
constrains the United States in pursuing its preferred deterrence strategies in response to Soviet or Eastern 
bloc aggression m Europe or its strategic moves around the globe
The implications for arms control of British and French nuclear forces will be explored within a 
framework o f analysis defined by the reluctant willingness o f the nuclear parties to cooperate in bargaining 
over arms control regime to regulate the nuclear arms race Implied is the recognition by the nuclear states 
with varying degrees of clarity and commitment, that jointly defined tacit or explicit rules and a rule 
making process for developing and deploymg nuclear systems and in conducting research and development 
on new systems are critical if the costs and nsks o f an arms race and nuclear war are to be mutually 
controlled. Within this frame o f mind, a negotiated nuclear environment, whatever its tenuous and 
provisional construction is valued more than a unilaterally determined nuclear environment This 
assumption is essentially based on the presumably shared if not always articulated, notion by nuclear foes 
and fnends that in the foreseeable future no state even the superpowers with their enormous resources and 
powerful nuclear arsenals can essentially disarm its rival and forestall a devastating counter attack These 
conditions define a state o f mutual assured destruction (MAD) that generates incentives even between 
distrusting opponents to cooperate m negotiating a tolerable arms control regime 6 The limits o f the 
negotiating framework defined by MAD are broad and indistinct It does not automatically indicate the 
announced and actual strategies best suited to the needs and technological and economic resources o f each
5nuclear actor or the strike capabilities deployment patterns organizational structures and operating modes 
that they will or should adopt These may well range from a posture of minimum deterrence to limited 
nuclear war
A cautionary note should also be introduced at the outset that the superpowers may well re evaluate 
and significantly qualify their mutual mterest in a negotiated, albeit evolving arms control regime It is 
premature to conclude that the incentives for negotiation direct or tacit, will be fully abandoned or even that 
they can be abandoned given the fact that with differential weight and effect the nuclear systems of the 
superpowers and increasingly those of the European states hold the security interests o f each state at risk 
Breaking off talks say m Geneva, is not the same as barring negotiations by other means and mechanisms 
or desisting from efforts to influence allied and adversary nuclear behavior Since no state has been able to 
get its full way or say there are signs that SALT I and II may be permitted to unravel or even be abrogated 
or substantially revised SALT II remains unratified SALT II is under seige by SDI and Soviet ABM  
efforts the Geneva talks appear to be getting nowhere and a nuclear test moratorium and ratification of the 
partial test ban treaty do not appear likely as each side gives new impetus to developmg new offensive and 
defensive systems President Reagan s May 27 announcement that the United States w ill no longer be 
bound (though it may continue to observe) SALT II limits provides further indications o f  a trend toward 
unilateralism It may w ell be that the East and West are on the threshold o f  a new arms race uninhibited by 
mutual agreed upon limits 7
The following discussion examines the implications o f the British and French nuclear systems 
principally m light o f  a negotiated nuclear environment based essentially on the bargaining assumptions 
not necessarily the specific codicils o f the SALT I and II treaties The actual details o f both treaties may 
well be altered m the coming months and years What is important to focus on is the role that the 
European nuclear states are playing or might assume in incorporating their forces into a stabler multilateral 
deterrence system and arms control regime m preserving such a framework or m forestalling the 
development o f a more unilaterally defined nuclear environment m which their capacity for effective 
autonomous initiative might be reduced or nullified. An erosion or breakdown o f the current arms control 
regime and process bodes ill for the stability o f multilateral deterrence the prospects for meaningful arms
6control arrangements and reductions and the weakening of an international regime to disciple the nuclear 
modernization o f the superpowers and the European states In such a degraded negotiating framework the 
expectations o f  cooperation in nuclear strategic policy making and arms control among allies marking 
NATO s two track decision o f December 1979 on the deployment o f U  S Pershing Ils and cruise missiles in 
Europe will be necessarily narrowed and the superpower offensive and defensive arms race will be freed of 
many presently constraining limits
Unlike a bargaining framework based on negotiated arrangements a unilaterally defined arms regime 
is one in which no nuclear actor is inclined, implicitly or explicitly to accept or legitimate the force le\ els 
or strategies pursued by its adversary nor even necessarily those o f its allies i e principally the United 
States in this case Under these circumstances the East West conflict would move toward a stage o f pure 
multilateral deterrence where the distinction between ally and adversary would begin to blur and the 
alignments among nuclear states over strategic and arms control issues would become more fluid and less 
predictable Arms control would tend to be a function o f the limits o f the technological and economic 
resources that actors can or are willing to devote to the development o f offensive and defensive strategic 
systems
Secretary o f  State George Schultz has suggested a growing U  S inclination to m ove toward a 
unilaterally defined nuclear environment and a purer form of multilateral deterrence than has been prevalent 
until now in his defense o f President Reagan s May 27 announcement What we are talking about here is a 
shift of gears from a form o f restraint under a treaty that was never ratified and was being violated for that 
matter and has been mcreasmgly obsolete The President said lets shift to a form of restraint that looks at 
the behavior by the Soviet Union and looks at the responsibility that the United States has and its allies 
have for maintenance o f defensive deterrent capability What we need for deterrence is a reflection of what 
the Soviet Union has aimed at us ® If these considerations gam ascendancy the tasks facing British and 
French leaders as the discussion below suggests will be associated less with those concerned with 
bargaining over the terms o f integrating the British and French nuclear systems into the SALT START 
Geneva process than with efforts aimed at preserving hard won gams to stabilize deterrence to advance arms 
control understandings and to reinforce the institutionalization o f arms reduction negotiations as a
7precondition for enlarged detente between East and W est The discussion starts with the problem of 
integrating British and French forces into the present arms control regime and ends with a look at o f the 
growing incentives for London and Pans to assume initiative to preserve the regime
British and French Nuclear Systems and a
Negotiated Nuclear Environment
Challenge to the Soviet Union. Current Forces
British Nuclear Systems —  The current status and future prospects o f British and French nuclear 
forces pose senous problems for Soviet leadership Table 1 sketches present British nuclear forces It is 
composed o f  four nuclear submarines each armed with 16 Polaris A3TK missiles At least one submarine 
is always on station and two almost always (with perhaps a six week to two-month lag) m waters off the 
northern coast o f Great Britain  ^ In a crisis with adequate political warning it is assumed that at least two 
and perhaps three submarines w ill be deployed The A3TK is a modified version o f  the Polaris It has a 
range o f approximately 4700 kilometers and carnes a British developed Chevaline warhead The Chevaline s 
composition while secret, is reportedly filled with penetration decoys and perhaps up to three 200 kiloton 
warheads The Chevaline qualifies as a multiple (MRV) but not MIRVed or independently targeted, re 
entry vehicle system smce warheads impact on a defined target m close proximity o f  each other Despite 
this limitation the Chevaline marks a major improvement over the one megaton warhead o f the Polans 
A3 The number o f available strategic warheads will have increased from 80 to perhaps 192 while warhead 
accuracy reliability and penetration will have been upgraded.
Chevaline consists o f a Penetration Aid Carrier (PAC) which is akin to an American warhead bus 
capable o f maneuvering in space Penetration aids have been included m the package to blind and confuse 
Soviet ABM radars Unable to distinguish between warheads and decoys Soviet ABM defenses will be 
induced to expend more ABMs to defeat Chevaline The Chevaline is deployed in space at about 12 000 
mph and re enters the atmosphere at approximately the same rate of speed. This speed poses senous fire 
control problems for Soviet ABM units even when expanded to the SALT I limit o f 100 launchers around 
Moscow The Soviet system compnsing long range missiles aimed toward space and a new silo based
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NOTES TO TABLE 1
1 IISS, p 161, lists a range of 3200 km See n 5 and Laird, p 46
2 IISS, p 161, and Yost, p 18, cite a payload of one bomb, Laird, p 46,
and Barker and Fieldhouse, p 42, indicate two 70 kt bombs Stockpile total 
taken from A r k m  and Fieldhouse, p 42
3 21 Mirage IVs to be reduced to 18 carrying air-to-surface missiles (ASM) by 
1987 Sources differ on payload The Military Balance arri Grove (d 19)  c i t o  
150 kt , Yost estimates the ASM at 150-300 kt (p 19)
4 The number of Pluton systems cited by sources vary from 30 to 44 These 
are reloadable with perhaps up to 100 warheads available for firing See Yost, 
p 50, Arkin and Fieldhouse, p 42, list 120 ANT-51 warheads
5 IISS, p 161, lists a range of 1600 km based on a notion of "theoretical
maximum range at optimum altitude and speed " Laird, Yost, arri Grove base their
estimates apparently on combat payload ,
6 IISS, p 161, lists a range of 2400 km based on considerations noted in n 
5 Laird, Yost, and Grove are cited here
7 IISS, p 161, lists one or two bombs
8 Two submarines reportedly carry Chevaline, as of December 1984, the other 
two were being fitted for the bus See Jane*s Defence Weekly, December 15,
1984, II, No 23, pp 1068-1069 Sources differ on the number of warheads 
Jane*s and IISS, p 161, cite 3, Arkm and Fieldhouse, 2
9 Sources differ on the deployment by British Jaguars of nuclear ordnance 
IISS, p 161, lists the British Jaguar as nonnuclear, Grove, p 20, cites the 
aircraft as armed with a nuclear device
10 IISS, p 161, cites British purchase of 123 Tornados in British stocks m
1985, including the GR1 strike and F-2 fighter versions Grove, p 10, 
indicates 80 WE-177 bombs are deployed in West Germany, the remainder are 
apparently based in Britain A total of 220 Tornados were ordered
11 ASW-helicopters (Sea King, Wasp, Lynx) equipped with nuclear depth charges 
are excluded
8endoatmosphenc Sprint type interceptor missile *0 Each British warhead is hardened against nuclear 
magnetic pulses from ABM nuclear explosions and is coated with an ablative substance to resist heat. 11 
The Chevaline would appear to meet the British M oscow test o f minimal penetrability
With a complement o f two nuclear submarines and an estimated 96 warheads at sea m a crisis 
British targeters w ill have a wider set o f  targets than just Moscow Analysts differ on how wide that set 
might be ranging from a conservative estimate by Lawrence Freedman that it may be that [Chevaline] 
does commit Britain to an attack on a few and possibly no more than one large targets) ^  to a projection 
that, with aircraft assisted strikes up to forty target sets might be attacked.13 Calculations made on the 
basis o f  Britain s Polans fleet o f 64 Polaris A3 missiles suggest a capacity to put at nsk  upwards o f 20  
million people and 25 per cent o f the Soviet Umon s industrial capacity ^  Despite the limited options 
available to Chevaline (each bus w ill still leave only a smgle if  wider footprint than the one megaton 
Polans 3 A) it would appear reasonable to assume that it w ill have at least the same and very likely 
greater destructive power than the Polans A3 s with a higher degree o f probability o f  penetrating alerted 
Soviet defenses and o f hitting targets with greater accuracy
French Nuclear Systems —  The French force is also growing increasingly formidable It is currently 
composed o f  three legs The most significant is the sea based force o f  six nuclear submarines three o f  
which are on patrol at any given time ^  Five submarines are equipped with M  20 missiles with a range o f  
approximately 3000 km. Each submanne cam es 16 missiles armed with a one megaton warhead plus 
penetration aids and decoys A  sixth nuclear submarine the Inflexible was completed m 1985 and is 
equipped with M-4 missiles with a range m excess o f 4000 km. The M-4 warhead is MIRVed and is 
composed o f  six warheads o f  approximately 150 kilotons The six fleet force currently affords France 176 
warheads m total In operation with three submannes on patrol it is confined to a range o f 48 one megaton 
warheads or a mix o f 128 one megaton (32) and 150 kt weapons (96) The long range M-4 missile permits 
French submannes to operate outside the Greenland Iceland United Kingdom Gap while those armed with 
M 20 missiles must be launched from closer to French soil ^
9These forces are complemented by missile and aircraft ground based systems Eighteen S3
intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) are deployed on the Albion Plateau in southeastern France
They are grouped mto two squadrons o f mne each Each missile is hardened and spaced approximately 3 to
8 km. apart This force is highly vulnerable to Soviet attack from SS 20 missiles with a flight time o f
only a few  minutes French strategists tend to look upon the force as more a trigger o f  French submanne
and possibly aircraft based forces than as a usable part of the French deterrent A  1983 French parliamentary
report conceded that the S3 force is vulnerable but once h it as the French expect if deterrence breaks down 
»
the signature o f such an attack would justify the use o f the strategic nuclear forces against the 
aggressor 17
A Mirage IV force o f 21 bombers armed with one (possibly two) AN 22 60 70 kt bombs is the third 
leg o f  the tnad This force is being replaced currently with a fleet o f 18 Mirage IVs armed with medium 
range air to ground missiles (air sol moyenne portée. ASMPl These air launched missiles have a range of 
somewhere between 100 300 km. and carry a warhead variably estimated from 100-300 k t  at a speed o f  
Mach 2 While the missile increases Mirage penetrability the aircraft w ill still have to be re fueled m 
flight by American built KC 135 tankers very likely over or near enemy territory m the face o f active 
SAM missile defenses and thousands o f anti aircraft fighters The Mirage force with ASMP missiles is 
expected to remain in operation until 1992 1994
British and French Theatre Nuclear Forces —  Both Britain and France have tactical nuclear forces 
aside from British atomic artillery capable of deep strikes mto eastern Europe with the possibility o f  
reaching some targets m the Soviet Umon m desperate raids A  small fleet o f  30 Buccaneer and possibly 36 
Jaguar aicraft were said to be available to Britain m 1985 ^  They are scheduled to be replaced by 220 
Tomado GR Is m the near future o f which 140 are reportedly deployed m Britain and m forward bases in 
Germany The Tomado will carry two bombs with a maximum yield o f 200 kilotons ^  The short range 
o f the Tornado (1300 km.) restricts it essentially to an interdiction role within NATO battlefield planning
French tactical systems while more varied than those o f the British are similarly restricted to a 
theatre battlefield role or to what the French characterize as a deterrent maneuver m support o f their strategic 
forces 20 Each o f  the services has its own nuclear units The army is equipped with approximately 44
10
Pluton reloadable launchers capable o f  firing a 15 or 25 kt. missile 120 km The Pluton may be refired in 
30 minutes Over 100 warheads are reportedly available for the five Pluton regiments that have been 
deployed These are dispersed at more than 15 km. distance from each other and are ready to fire within 
three mmutes 2 *
Ground and sea based aircraft are also equipped with tactical nuclear weapons The French air force 
arms 45 Jaguar and 30 Mirage IDs with atomic bombs rated at 15 kilotons The combat range o f these 
strike forces is limited, ranging from 720 750 km. for the Jaguar and 800 km. for the Mu-age The navy is 
also arming its Super Etendards with 15 kt bombs In 1985 36 Super Etendards earned atomic weapons
British and French Modernization —  As Table 2 suggests Bntish and French nuclear modernization 
programs for the 1990s w ill complicate Soviet defensive planning The dramatic increase m invulnerable 
striking power o f  French Bntish delivery systems and warheads with their increased reliability penetration 
efficiency and accuracy w ill insure the ability o f  each state, alone to threaten the Soviet Union as a viable 
society In the 1990s Bntain is scheduled to acquire four Tndent submarines armed with advanced, state of 
the art D  5 missiles The Bntish Tndent will carry 16 D  5 missiles (not 24 as m the U  S version) At 
full payload the range o f  the D  5 at over 7000 km is approximately 50 percent greater than the Bntish 
Polaris A3TK and approaches m accuracy those o f land based systems (estimated at a circular probable error 
(CEP) o f 150 meters) 22 Each missile can carry from 8 to 14 MIRVed warheads with accompanying 
penetration aids decoys and heat and electronically resistant covenngs There is an inverse ratio between 
deliverable kilotonage and the number o f warheads The U  S Navy has fixed on two entry vehicles for D 5 
the new 475 kt Mk5/W88 with eight warheads o f  475 k t  and 100 kt M k4/wW 76 (Tndent C-4) with 
approximately 12 14 warheads
The Bntish government has announced that its D  5 missiles will be each restneted to 8 warheads The 
self imposed cons tramt appears at least partially related to an arms control concern that the United Kingdom 
not deploy more warheads than appears necessary to meet its counter value deterrent needs vis a vis the 
Soviet Union A  defense ministry paper affirms that acquisition o f the D  5 would not involve any 
significant change in the planned total number o f  warheads associated with our strategic deterrent force in 
comparison with the original intentions for a force based on the C-4 missile system 23 There is room to
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1ABLE 2
FRENCH AND BRITISH STRATEGIC 
AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE 
1990s
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doubt this assertion The D  5 with the Mk5AV88 bus would more than quadruple the explosive power o f  
the C-4 m issile while offering the possibility o f increasing the number o f  smaller yield warheads that can 
be loaded on the D  5 should circumstances dictate a change in targeting options The British government s 
self limitation on greater flexibility m targeting choices while ostensibly bound by a solemn unilateral 
declaration o f intent to restrict Britain to C-4 warhead numbers can be rescmded at any time in light of 
changing security needs By the British Defense Minister s own admission [T]he number o f warheads that 
the Tndent IID  5 w ill carry and therefore Tndents striking power remains wholly a matter o f  choice for 
the British government 24
The British government has already reversed itself on Tndent modernization first choosing the C 4 in 
1980 and later opting for the D 5 apparently on grounds o f enhanced launch survivability and purported 
cost effectiveness to bnng Bntain s system mto line with the U  S submanne force o f the 1990s 25 This 
presents an additional tncky problem, as discussed below m integrating Bntish nuclear forces into an arms 
control regime —  all the more so since at a minimum one can expect London to deploy 512 strategic 
warheads aimed at the Soviet Union At least one submanne and very likely two to three can be expected to 
be on patrol m an emergency This would make somewhere between 128 to 384 MIRVed missiles 
available to Bntain deployed m an invulnerable second strike mode If one assumes a 12 warhead per 
missile payload, Bntish capabilities nse from 192 to 576 if one to three boats respectively are on station 
Bntain s M AD requirements may thus be estimated to vary from as much as 512 475 kiloton to 768 100 
kiloton warheads —  and even perhaps 896 warheads if Bntish missiles are armed up to D  5 limits of 14 
warheads all m a MIRVed mode
Expenence with Chevaline also suggests a sophisticated Bntish understanding o f the penetration 
problem and o f ways to solve it. The D 5 footprint goes well beyond a minimum M oscow test Bntain is 
now poised to deliver nuclear warheads against military and logistical support systems o f the Soviet Union 
and Warsaw pact states When linked to NATO nuclear and U S capabilities it may be viewed as a 
potentially first strike weapon system. A  1981 parliamentary report observed that after a decade o f patrols 
by the Polans fleet, Bntish submarines had always escaped detection or trailing by Soviet ASW forces 26 
The greater range o f the D  5 increases the cruising distance o f the Tndent, multiplying by several fold the
tracking problems confronting the Soviet Union and making the system virtually invulnerable to attack 
barring a major breakthrough m Soviet ASW capabilities
French nuclear modernization adds to Soviet worries Four o f the five submarines each o f  which now 
carry M 20 single one megaton warheads will be retrofitted with the M-4 missiles deploying six 150 kt 
warheads France s first nuclear submarine will remain equipped with 16 M  20s and remain in service until 
the end o f the 1990s retiring shortly after a seventh nuclear submanne with M-4 missiles arrives on 
station The IRBM system will still be m operation adding an additional 18 one megaton warheads to 
France s nuclear arsenal In total France will have 614 strategic warheads sometime m the late 1990s and 
no less than 598 for the first decade o f the twenty first century Like Bntarn France will vastly enlarge its 
target coverage o f the Soviet Union relaive to its initial Polans fleet of 80 warheads and vulnerable IRBM 
and Mirage IV forces
By the 1990s France and Britain could have as many as almost 1500 warheads in 10 submarines (4
British and 6 French) half o f which can be expected to be at sea at any time The U  S Tndent fleet o f 24
on
submarines will carry approximately 5200 warheads composed o f a mix o f 475 k t  and 100 kt warheads 
British and French submarine forces will comprise almost 25 percent o f the West s submanne based striking 
power In this category the European states will have moved from a position o f  less than 3 percent o f the 
W est s total as late as 1984 28 That is too sizeable force to be ignored or tnvialized either by the Soviet 
Union or by the United States How these forces w ill be utilized and what operational strategy will guide 
their use m threatening or attacking the Soviet Union is o f vital interest to both superpowers Neither can 
be indifferent to Bnùsh or French independent use of these forces The Soviet Union faces amhdiations 
the U  S as the major ally risks losing control o f deterrence bargaining established between itself and the 
Soviet Union particularly during a crisis and o f having the strategies and needs o f  its smaller partners 
dictate its moves despite its greater resources and global interests and responsibilities Under these 
circumstances superpower arms accord is also hampered Superpower collusion to put pressure on France 
and Britain to limit or modify their modernization program potentially pits the U S against its allies and 
m any event, forces a revision o f present understandings between London and Washington over the sale of
Tridents and D  5 missiles
Nuclear weapons are a great equalizer They not only deter a more powerful foe but, as General Andre 
Beaufre recognized even before France first created a force de frappe nuclear weapons raise the stakes of any
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conflict The threat and the destructive losses that their use implies make what would otherwise be 
secondary or peripheral to an ally o f vital importance to it if  its nuclear ally was prepared to employ nuclear 
weapons 29 The nsk o f  involvement m a nuclear war and o f escalation getting out o f hand create incentives 
for the more powerful nuclear ally (the United States) to assign higher priority to a smaller nuclear ally s 
security concerns than it might otherwise and thereby extend its deterrent power to the ally Failure to meet 
such a test o f  w ill between allies in the face o f the common adversary s challenge and to seek an isolated or 
insulated posture from the crisis would be tantamount to abandoning an ally at its hour o f need and o f  
essentially shattering the confidence between allies in each others s support that is essential to the 
maintenance o f a security alliance The impact o f multilateral deterence among allies on their security and 
arms control policies and those o f  the common adversary the Soviet Union next needs examination
Challenge to the United States. Doctrines and Operational Strategies
British Doctrine and Practice —  The creation and continued modernization o f the British and French 
nuclear deterrents to respond to the threats posed by the Soviet Umon to their security and vital political 
interests m Europe presents only part o f the multilateral deterrence framework within which Britain and 
France operate Their deterrent doctrines and practices are calculated simultaneously to influence American 
nuclear strategy whether pursued unilaterally or within the context o f the Atlantic Alliance and its NATO 
integrated military structure Grasp o f these added elements o f multilateral deterrence is a prerequisite for 
identifying the lmes o f  possible changes m national and alliance policy that might be reasonably entertained 
to strengthen the present nuclear arms control regime British and French forces have evolved within that 
framework and the set o f national expectations that it engendered about legitimate levels o f mutual 
destructability
British and French strategic doctrine their nuclear arms control positions their approach to Amene an 
and NATO nuclear policies and the domestic political consensus on which then- nuclear policies rest trace a 
baseline from which one may reasonably project a plausible range o f shifts in Bntish and French behavior
from current practice Specifically British and French participation m strengthening SALT and the SALT 
process is more likely to develop out o f widely held national assumptions about the uses o f nuclear 
weapons and habits ingrained from long experience m creating and managing nuclear systems than from 
imposed or preconceived notions promoted by the superpower about the role that these forces can and should 
play m arms control negotiations and m the elaboration o f a negotiated nuclear regime Superpower efforts 
to draw the European nuclear powers into the arms control process are likely to be successful only if they 
are sensitive to the internal political arrangements and shared strategic assumptions on which the British and 
French systems differentially rest These political arrangements and strategic assumptions are potentially 
mampulable in desirable ways for the superpowers as the discussion below suggests on the conditions that 
the supeipowers furnish incentives for participation that respond to British and French security needs 
externally and to imperatives for internal governmental and societal cohesion An American appeal to 
alliance loyalty to induce British and French participation as some analysts have suggested, may be a nght 
step but it w ill be m the wrong direction if it fails to address French and British concerns ^0
Except for the fact that the British and French nuclear systems are under indigenous governmental 
authority they present almost totally opposed responses to Soviet and to U  S nuclear forces Despite 
periods o f  tension with the United States over nuclear policies and isolation from the American nuclear 
program m the decade after World War II the thrust of British nuclear policy has been to work closely with 
the United States m almost all phases o f its nuclear development from the initial organization o f  Britain s 
V bomber force to the creation o f its sea based systems This is not the place to retrace the long and 
intricate development o f  the special U  S British nuclear relationship This has been discussed elsewhere -1 ^  
What is important for this analysis is to establish the point that Britain s nuclear force especially its 
current Polaris system and even more so its Trident modernization program, are scarcely conceivable 
without reference to continued and significant American economic technological and logistical assistance 
From this point it follows that neither the creation nor management o f the British nuclear system nor its 
future prospects can be conceived apart from the U S deterrent system although for political reasons there 
may be incentives to obscure or downplay the linkage British claims o f independence while certainly real 
smce the British effort to develop modem weapons and strike forces has historically been substantial and
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impressive must be qualified by the debt owed to U S assistance and to the web o f obligations and 
expectations that have been created in being tied so closely to the changing strategic needs and demands of 
the United States and to the organisational structure and operational modes o f its nuclear forces
Under the Trident program Britain will have access to American nuclear submanne missile and 
warhead technology It is not likely that it will again undertake a costly re development program like 
Chevaline although it is expected to process its own warheads ^2 The Bntish decision to adopt the D 5 
missile despite its war fighting and silo busting features in conflict with Bntish minimum deterrent needs 
was dictated by the advanced design of the missile and its anticipated incorporation m the Amencan arsenal 
as the principal sea based nuclear system of the United States into the twenty first century Cooperation 
will be further extended m the form o f Bntain s use o f the U S naval base at King s Bay Georgia as 
Tndent s technical support base not Coulport m Scotland ^
Since World War II Bntish nuclear strategy has been based on the dual and not fully compatible 
notions o f  an independent national nuclear deterrent integrated into Amencan nuclear planning m NATO for 
the defense o f Bntain and Europe These aims introduced a fundamental ambiguity into Bntish thinking 
that persists until today On the one hand, a Bntish deterrent was important to enable Bntain to act 
independently if need arose if  again it had to stand alone as in the early days o f World War II An 
independent force capable o f contnbutmg to the Amencan effort, also insured coverage o f targets that might 
either not be ignored by the United States or of lesser mterest to it ^  Beyond these two roles —  as 
mdependent actor and as compliant ally —  there was a third and more important role influencing Amencan 
nuclear decisions precisely through the possession o f an independent nuclear capacity By means o f joint 
targeting and consultation over strategy it was believed that Bntain would gam access to Amencan nuclear 
decision making Such access was considered as important as the development o f an mdependent nuclear 
force to deter Soviet attacks directly
Since World War II the United States was understood to be indispensable for the defense of Bntain 
and Europe Both its resources and political will had to be engaged An mdependent nuclear force was 
paradoxically conceived as part o f this alliance binding strategy Margaret Gowing descnbes the early 
thinking o f  the Bntish Chiefs o f  Staff m their development o f a global strategy for the United Kingdom
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The British part in this strategy was fourfold to exercise influence on Cold War policy to 
meet NATO obligations to prepare for war in case the deterrent failed and to play a part, albeit 
a small one m the mam deterrent, the air offensive This fourfold problem must be solved 
without ruining the economy
What o f  the British part in the atomic deterrent? The deterrent at present rested entirely m 
Amene an hands The document concluded that, largely for economic reasons it must remain 
there But, said the Chiefs o f Staff it would be quite wrong for the United Kingdom to take no 
share in it It was not possible to rely on the Amencans to deal adequately with targets not of 
direct strategic interest to the United States W e feel that to have no share in what is 
recognized as the mam deterrent m the cold war and the only Allied offensive m a world war 
would senously weaken Bntish influence on United States policy and planning in the cold war 
and m war would mean that the United Kingdom would have no claim to any share in the 
policy or planning o f the offensive 3 5
As early as 1948 Bntish planners estimated that m a decade 600 nuclear weapons would be needed 
m defendmg against and detemng the Soviet Union The United States was expected to furnish two thirds 
o f this number and Bntam the remainder Despite the McMahon Act o f 1946 which prevented Bntish 
access to the Amencan nuclear program, Bntish military planners continued to work closely with their 
Amencan counterparts B 29s were stationed m Bntain and by the 1950s all were capable o f carrying 
nuclear weapons Cooperation improved with the amendment o f the McMahon Act The Atomic Energy 
Act o f  1954 permitted the United States to transfer weapons information to nuclear advanced states 36 i t led 
eventually to the sigmng m 1958 o f a cooperative accord between the two states that has since regulated 
their exchange o f information about nuclear intelligence matenals delivery vehicles propulsion systems 
and warheads 37 This has been an entirely one way street m the postwar penod Bntain contnbuted,
among other things fissionable matenal and know how on weapons design to Amencan researchers In 
1957 it accepted U S Thor IRBMs and contracted for the Skybolt air to ground missile to arm its bomber 
fleet
The cancellation o f  Skybolt and the withdrawal o f  Thor were only temporary setbacks in the Bntish 
quest to develop a close and continuing nuclear partnership with the United States Over the reservations of  
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, who had dismissed small independent nuclear systems as dangerous 
expensive prone to obsolescence and lacking in credibility as a deterrent, 38 President Kennedy agreed m 
December 1962 to provide Polans missiles and design know how for the submanne platform and warheads 
as a substitute for the cancelled air to surface Skybolt missile In exchange Pnm e Minister Macmillan 
agreed to assist in developing a multilateral nuclear force and to designate Polans missiles to NATO and to
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integrate their targeting with NATO plans ^9 American resistance to the notion o f independent nuclear 
forces gradually eroded, aided by the demise (thanks partly to British reluctance) o f NATO multilateral 
nuclear force 40 In a reversal o f McNamara thinking the United States acknowledged in the NATO Ottawa 
declaration o f  1974 that European nuclear syterns contributed to deterrence
From an alliance perspective Tndent modernization when linked to British support for the 
deployment o f American theatre nuclear forces m Europe under NATO command solidifies the integration 
process underlying British policy Tndent targeting will continue to be coordinated with NATO plans and 
the system is supposed to be available to SACEUR Tndent will add significant numbers o f new warheads 
to the NATO and, by extension to the Amencan arsenal raising the possibility of Bntish cooperation m 
limited nuclear strikes against Warsaw Pact and Soviet military bases The Bntish Tndent implicitly 
couples Bntish and Amencan nuclear systems and potentially incorporates Bntish forces into U S 
planning The latter has been progressively movmg toward a limited nuclear strike posture —  what might 
be charactenzed as a M AD plus strategy 4 * To the degree that Bntish warheads are available for NATO 
U S use through SACEUR and are integrated with the 108 Pershing n  and 464 cruise missiles to be 
deployed by the United States m Europe —  of which 160 cruise missiles (GLCMs) will be stationed m the 
United Kingdom, the U  S w ill be able legally to circumvent SALT limits on MIRVed delivery vehicles 
Neither the Amencan nor the Bntish Tndent systems can be realistically evaluated apart from this larger 
Amencan strategic framework As one analyst has observed, Tndent advocates choose to see the missile m 
isolation whereas m fact it will be integrated in war plans with the M X Pershmg II Midgetman stealth 
cruise missiles and bombers and eventually Bntish Tndent II forces 4^
In this light, Bntish forces are viewed m some U S planmng circles as a valuable supplement to 
European and global deterrence Bntain is also seen as playing a valuable balancing role on the continent 
It simultaneously helps to maintain over all bloc panty with the Warsaw Pact and offsets German economic 
and conventional military power Since France could not be relied upon as a nuclear partner within the 
alliance the role o f interlocutor for Amencan nuclear policy in Europe fell almost by default to Bntain 
Tndent places into relief Bntain s diverse deterrence and diplomatic roles even more so than Polans did a 
weapons generation ago when President de Gaulle vetoed Bntain s entry into the European Community
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largely in reaction to Britain s nuclear dependency on the United States The utility o f an independent 
British deterrent as a balance wheel in the European Community and as a means through which to project 
American security preferences has grown since the disputacious period o f the early Polans years What 
distinguished 1962 from 1980 as one student o f British nuclear policy notes was the unarticulated 
recognition that independent British forces were militarily useful m an era o f strategic panty and politically 
essential m a time o f  growing W est German power ^3 Bntain is second only to West Germany in the 
number o f U  S nuclear weapons deployed m its soil (1268) It also serves as a base for U S nuclear 
delivery systems including 170 F i l l  fighters Poseidon submarines and GLMCs In addition it houses 
key nuclear and naval command centers and air and space surveillance units o f the U S and NATO 44 
Contrasting with this picture o f the integration o f British nuclear forces into American and NATO 
security planning is the persistent assertion by British leaders and military commanders that British nuclear 
forces must remam independent to serve specific British national interests The British developed an atomic 
(1952) and then a thermonuclear device (1957) quite independently o f the United States The V bomber 
force o f Valiant (1955) Vulcan (1957) and Victor (1958) aircraft provided Bntain a credible strike force 
potentially capable o f delivenng 230 megatons on an equal number of targets 4  ^ In the early 1960s Bntain 
had more deliverable megatonnage at its disposal than a decade later with Polans although by the time that 
the V bomber force was fully operational it was threatened as a survivable system by the introduction of 
ICBMs into the Soviet arsenal and the upgrading of Warsaw Pact air defenses
Both the Polans and the Tndent, while earmarked for NATO can be withdrawn at any time for 
national use It seems reasonable to assume that these forces will not be available to S ACEUR when they 
may be most needed. Either there will not be enough time to complete the necessary consultations and 
clearances for access to them by SACEUR or they will have already been withdrawn by Bntish authonties 
to discharge their pnmary missions which is to attack as one government document indicates key aspects 
of Soviet power 4^ NATO plans are less definitive m their military objective As Lawrence Freedman 
concludes in his analysis o f Bntish targeting policy [DJespite the assignation o f Bntain s nuclear forces 
to NATO the assumptions and dominant plans surrounding their targeting do not, as far as can be gathered 
from the public record naturally fit in with any NATO plans The trend in Bntish public pronouncements
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suggests that the standing alone hypothesis is the underlying rationale for the nuclear force ^7 jn a word 
British nuclear forces are poised m two potentially conflicting modes as an instrument o f alliance cohesion 
with the United States and its NATO partners and as a servant of an independent national will and mterest 
Any arms control regime to which Britain might be a party will have to be reconciled with this strategic 
ambiguity o f  long standing 48
French Doctrine and Practice —  The French case presents no fewer problems than does Britain in 
reconciling French nuclear doctrine and operational strategy with an arms control regime compatible with 
superpower policy With the installation o f the Fifth Republic and the ascendancy o f Charles de Gaulle to 
the presidency France has single mmdedly pursued a policy of national independence m developing its 
nuclear forces Rejected were Fourth Republic claims that the French program was at the disposal o f the 
western alliance In the aftermath o f  the Suez crisis and the U  S decision to refuse French access to its 
nuclear know how on a par with Britain all hope of being able to cooperate with the United States as an 
equal partner was also abandoned as an option 4  ^ French withdrawal from the NATO military integrated 
framework underscored de Gaulle s Fifth Republic s determination to employ its conventional and nuclear 
forces independently o f NATO S SACEUR or its allies
Like Britain French nuclear policy is based on the notion o f proportional deterrence The French 
nuclear force is expected to inflict greater damage on an adversary than the expected gam m attacking French 
vital interests In contrast to British concern for retaining the American nuclear guarantee by encouraging 
consultation and cooperation and by commiting its conventional and nuclear forces to NATO planning 
French policy makers since de Gaulle have jealously guarded French independence and refuse to identify if 
and when French forces will be available m the alliance s response to Soviet or Warsaw bloc aggression 
Specifically at issue are conventional and tactical nuclear forces which may be used quite separately from 
NATO units They are subordinate to France s deterrent maneuvering and their use is to be m strict 
conformity with French needs
It is impossible to say with certainty at what point France will cooperate with its allies in 
conventional operations before it unleashes its tactical or strategic nuclear forces The views o f General
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Mery roundly criticized at home when they were first propounded m 1976 appear to have gamed ground in 
official thinking and policy Mery cast France s defense and deterrent strategy in terms o f cooperation with 
its allies while retaining unqualified national control o f France s nuclear and nonnuclear forces Rejecting 
the idea o f a national sanctuary protected by France s force de frappe Méry envisioned a much wider terrain 
for French military action His enlarged sanctuary encompassed Europe and its approaches including the 
Mediterranean basin 50 That there COuld be two battles —  for Europe and then for France —  did not 
appear realistic French President Valéry Giscard d Estaing extended Mery s reasoning
Some people reason that any conflict taking place outside France would completely 
spare the national territory from battle This concept is unrealistic In fact, in the 
event o f conflict there would be only one zone because o f the speed o f transportation and 
communications especially by air and from the outset French national territory would be 
included in this generalized battle area For this reason there must be only one military 
system m this zone since there will only be one zone 51
Socialist President François Mitterrand continued along the path o f positioning France to participate 
m NATO operations if it chose to exercise that option while affirming France s autonomy o f decision and 
the possibilities o f non belligerancy and non automaücity At the Kremlin Mitterrand told his listeners 
that if we belong to a defensive alliance the Atlantic Alliance we are no less deprived, outside as 
we are to the integrated command of this Alliance o f our decisional autonomy 52 As for nuclear weapons 
explained the French president, only the President o f the French Republic can use them These are not 
words devoid o f reality We know in all certitude that our fate our independence our very survival depends 
on our autonomy 53 Former Defense Minister Charles Hemu also accented the dual stance o f the sanctity 
of national territory and the need for the mdependent nuclear forces as its guarantee and France s obligation 
to participate with its allies m joint defense o f alliance interests [N]uclear deterrence the expression 
o f the will o f  a unified nation observed Hemu in presenting the government s five year military plan to 
the National Assembly remains the foundation of our society This first circle is the sanctuary the 
permanent the untouchable or again what makes France what it is But France is not only a 
sanctuary She is directly concerned with the security o f its neighbors to which it is linked by 
treaty 54
The decisions to modernize France s tactical nuclear forces and to create a Force d Action Rapide 
(Rapid Action Force FAR) to reinforce its umts m Germany are designed to strengthen France s deterrent
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maneuverability and to assist its allies in more timely fashion if  the French president decides that it is in 
France s national interest to join m the forward battle against an attack from the east Tactical nuclear 
forces have been reorganized to differentiate them more clearly from conventional units This change wil 1 
presumably provide French decision makers with greater control over escalation and clearer articulation in 
utilizing France s forces to project progressive French determination to resist aggression Unlike Pluton 
Hadès which w ill become operational in the 1990s will not threaten West German territory if  while based 
in France it is used to strike at troop concentrations and installation m eastern Europe Hades role will be 
primarily to signal the preparation o f a strategic blow It will also have selective battlefield use (or as 
much as can be expected with 20 60 kiloton weapons) since the Right of Center government of Prime 
Minister Jacques Chicac has cancelled work on the neutron bomb) The warning from Hades stated French 
Armies Forces Chief o f Staff General Jeannou Lacaze must have military effect which is to say that it 
must be effective and brutal which means a relatively massive employment and therefore limited in time 
and space But above all this warning must be integrated m the general deterrent maneuver 55 
The changes made by the Socialist government m disposing France toward greater alliance 
cooperation however helpful in coordmating NATO and French moves still did not get at the heart o f the 
problem o f reconciling France s treaty commitments with its jealous retention o f national control over its 
forces The Socialist response to relax this tension in some way deepened it FAR was created at the 
expense o f a 22 000 man cut m ground forces France may get to the front more promptly but it will do so 
with fewer troops The designation o f  FAR for extra European duties also threaten to weaken its 
effectiveneess and perhaps its availability when needed given French Mediterranean and Black African 
security responsibilities Nor are critics mollified by statements such as those by former Defense Minister 
Charles Hemu Anyone who tells me that he prefers an additional division o f soldiers to a nuclear missile 
launching submarine is living m the wrong age 56 The problems raised by the French do not anse in such 
acute fashion with Bntain s conventional and nuclear forces Unlike French forces Bntish Tomado strike 
aircraft and nuclear ground artillery are assigned to SACEUR and integrated mto NATO planning This 
suggests a presumption if not necessarily a guarantee o f Bntain s early participation in a conventional 
battle in Europe
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There are several costs to alliance cohesion in French ambiguity about when where and m what 
manner France s conventional and tactical nuclear forces will be used m support o f its allies whatever one 
may say about ambiguity as a handmaiden o f deterrence Allied forces simply cannot count on French 
assistance or worse it may have to count on them all too well if  they trigger prematurely a nuclear 
exchange or a rapid and perhaps uncontrolled escalation o f a conflict The clearer and more articulated 
military and deterrent moves envisioned by French planners do not appear very plausible if both allies and 
adversaries are left m the dark about their use It is not clear how France w ill be able to communicate its 
intentions in a crisis if it has little experience in doing so during peace The vulnerability o f French nuclear 
ground units also invites preemption an incentive that would have been less heightened in the mind of an 
aggressor who had been conditioned to believe that an attack on France was simultaneously an attack 
against the western alliance The added concern o f German officials is understandable German officials are 
worried that in striking eastern targets many civilians will be killed They are Germans too ^7 Bonn 
insists Bonn has been unsuccessful m its efforts to learn about French plans despite repeated requests for 
clarification
Prospects for British and French Cooperation m Nuclear Arms Control 
Both European nuclear states pursue announced strategies o f  proportional deterrence For the next 
decade before their strategic warhead arsenals will have been expanded, they will be necessarily restricted to 
strikes against soft high value targets —  industrial complexes oil and logistical depots and population 
centers The M AD plus strategies o f the supeipowers —  involving targeting against military installations 
especially the nuclear systems of the opponent, selected nuclear strikes escalation control and dominance 
damage limitation and favorable war termination moves —  may well be precluded by the limitations of 
resources capabilities space and time confronting British and French forces These inherent limitations in 
the practice o f deterrence by the medium nuclear powers are enhanced by the possibility that one or the other 
might trigger a first use o f nuclear weapons by the United States or the Soviet Union and not necessarily 
by conscious design or deliberation While both governments deny such an intent,^  the structure and size 
o f their forces may under crisis circumstances raise or give added point to incentives bearing on the
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superpowers to disarm or diffuse British or French nuclear forces All nuclear powers may be catapulted 
into an unsought war which no one wanted
Both British and the French strategic forces raise the issue o f controlling and terminating hostilities 
if  they anse There is also the problem o f accidental unauthorized or unintended use not to mention 
Soviet preemption o f British and French nuclear forces While these sea based forces are currently 
invulnerable they are small Improvement in ASW or ABMs may in the future seriously degrade their 
effectiveness although for the immediate future especially when current modernization plans are completed 
both submarine based systems should be able to penetrate Soviet defenses and to unleash intolerable damage 
on the Soviet Union There lies the principal problem The British and French may impose on the United 
States (and the Soviet Umon) their preferred strategies or their unwitting moves on the superpowers It is 
precisely these possibilities that provide bargaming leverage for the British and French in manuplating the 
superpower to their liking and m cooperating —  or not —  m developing an arms control regime for nuclear 
weapons
The intimidating power which will be at the disposal o f London and Pans in the next decade prompts 
a review o f the prospects o f Bntish French participation in strengthening the arms control arrangements 
fashioned by SALT I and II The preceding analysis suggests that realistic expectation o f French and Bntish 
adaptation to the SALT regime if  it is indeed retamed by the superpowers themselves m its current ragged 
and refracted form, will have to be made compatible with the not always consistent and coherent strategic 
policies and aims pursued by the European nuclear states and not conceived simply on the basis o f an 
appraisal o f what might appear desirable m the abstract
Parameters o f Bntish and French Participation m the Arms Process —  The limits o f Bntish and 
French interest in participating m strategic arms limitation talks are fundamentally dictated by their need to 
dispose sufficiently invulnerable and reliable nuclear forces to credibly meet a test o f assured destruction in 
the wake o f  a Soviet attack on their strategic forces or against their vital interests Both states reject any 
limitations on their forces which would weaken or preclude their unilateral capacity to preserve an assured 
destruction standard as the minimal test of the effectivenss o f their deterrence policies France has been 
especially explicit on this point In a news conference on September 24 1982 President Mitterrand
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rejected the possibility that France s nuclear forces could be negotiated away France cannot accept that a 
part o f our nuclear armament is negotiable said the French president, because if that were so \* e would 
fall into a level at which our deterrent capacity would be destroyed France s international position 
refuses prohibitions We refuse to accept the prohibition o f others 59
In a similar vien one British arms control official observed that it is short o f absurd to suggest that 
the British deterrent force which is o f minimal size and capacity o f last resort, should be tied to an equation 
which links it with only one element [the SS 20] o f the threat posed by the Soviet Union to the United 
Kingdom To equate the British deterrent with the SS 20 is therefore not only wrong by definition but 
unacceptable m terms o f deterrence 60
Both governments would appear to agree to participation if  several conditions were m et First there 
would have to be substantial decreases m U S and Soviet offensive striking power As British Pnme 
Minister Margaret Thatcher put the matter If between the two big powers the numbers went down 
massively and enormously and we moved into a totally different world then there may be circumstances 
when ours [British nuclear forces] will have to be counted 61 Former French Foreign Minister Claude 
Cheysson made essentially the same point in citing as a precondition for French participation in arms talks 
the reduction o f the superpower arsenals to levels where one might consider that the gap between 
capabilities had changed m nature 62
Second, neither Britain nor France accepts the proposition that a separate Eurostrategic balance 
should be defined by the superpowers apart from their global balance Several related considerations underlie 
their positions Both are wary o f isolating Europe as an arena o f conflict wherem the superpowers would 
tacitly agree to sanctuanze their homelands Although Pans has withdrawn from NATO it shares London s 
concern that Amencan theatre and global nuclear forces be treated as a single field o f deployment in which 
the multilateral system o f deterrence that is constructed couples U S and European secunty interests in such 
a way that the risk o f a nuclear war in Europe is rendered indivisible among the nucleanzed western allies 63 
Both also reject the Soviet Union s assertion o f an implicit veto over Amencan deployment of 
intermediate range nuclear systems to respond to Soviet theatre capabilities President Mitterrand charged 
that the Soviet Union not the United States was upsetting the global and regional military balance In
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underlining the Soviet Union s search for European supremacy Mitterrand acknowledged that only the 
United States has the means to restore the balance o f power [and that] France will not hesitate to complete 
its deterrent weaponry 64 A Soviet veto over U S deployments would be tantamount to a privileged
Soviet position to define the superpower nuclear balance in Europe while decoupling the United States from 
its allies The western nuclear states are steadfast m denying this droit de regard to M oscow
Neither European nuclear power accepts the Soviet Umon s claim that British and French nuclear 
forces be included m intermediate nuclear force (INF) talks since they consider their forces as strategic (No 
matter that the United States excluded both states from SALT II negotiations because they were considered 
theatre forces while the two superpowers shifted roles m INF talks )65 London and Pans also object to 
any direct tie between their systems and Soviet theatre forces (SS 20 Backfire and forward base systems) 
out o f fear that the latter could be reduced m order to limit French and British capabilities while leaving 
untouched long range Soviet capabilities In a perverse fashion France and Britain would then be reduced to 
a zero option by Soviet dismantlement o f its theatre nuclear forces Similarly neither they nor the United 
States accept the view that the Soviet Union be compensated for the threatening systems aimed at it That 
would mean that the Soviet Union would have a right to an aggregate of striking power equal to the other 
major nuclear powers combined 66
An arms regime acceptable to France and Britain will therefore have to contain coupling features for 
U S deployments to tie the United States closer to Europe Additionally nuclear coupling is linked to the 
concern m both capitals that Germany be assured U S protection and that it be anchored to the western 
alliance The British Trident, as already noted, was partly justified as a means o f  maintaining the American 
connection the INF deployments were expected to solidify it Given France s iconoclastic nuclear position 
Britain is a better bridge between the U S and Germany than France The Soviet challenge to U S INF 
deployments and to British and French systems was calculated to weaken the delicate deterrence fabric woven 
by the western allies An arms regime must also acknowledge paradoxically that the western systems can 
act separately and independendy o f each other yet are constrained by alliance ties varying from the close 
working relations developed between British American and NATO nuclear planners to the more tenuous and 
distant commitments linking France to its alliance partners
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Third, not much progress in drawing France and Britain into nuclear arms talks is likely to be made 
unless the conventional balances m Europe favoring the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact are rectified 
France has explicitly set this as a condition for talks and also includes chemical and biological weapons in 
Europe as an impediment to its participation 67 The French are particularly reserved about the mutual 
balanced force reduction (MBFR) discussions in Vienna. Aside from then- usual objections to bloc to bloc 
discussions they fear that the West will be the ultimate loser because o f the superiority enjoyed by the 
Soviet Umon and its allies The American conventional presence is likely to be weakened limits on West 
German conventional build ups might be established and Soviet capacity to intervene militarily would not 
be materially affected by withdrawal because of its control over Warsaw pact forces and its proximity to 
western Europe The decisive French objection to MBFR as David Yost concludes has been that these 
negotiations could undermine the effectiveness o f the NATO structure and could handicap the pursuit of 
West European defense options in the long term 68 The French arms industry and, specifically close 
collaboration with W est Germany might be jeopardized by a conventional arms accord unfavorable to the 
West and potentially restrictive with respect to the development o f outlets for French arms which are 
indispensable to the preservation o f an indigenous arms production capacity 69
The fourth and most formidable obstacle to British and French participation or concessions to an 
arms regime is the development o f  superpower defersive capabilities including ABM ASW and ASAT 
systems ^  The British decision to develop Chevaline and, later to opt for the Trident n  or D  5 missile 
were pointedly guided by ABM developments Chevaline was designed to deflect the ABM missiles 
deployed around M oscow m conformance with the SALT I treaty D 5 was a hedge against a breakdown of 
the ABM Treaty regime and possible new deployments by the Soviets 71 it stretches credibility to believe 
that either Britain or France will be disposed to cut back on their nuclear modernization programs if SALT I 
is abrogated even if by mutual superpower consent ABM systems initially are likely to be more 
threatening to the medium nuclear powers than to either superpower although as noted earlier the size and 
sophistication o f the British and French nuclear systems of the 1990s are likely to be sufficiently resilient 
and robust to overcome a Soviet ABM m the immediate future 72 The number o f  warheads available to 
London and France would appear large enough to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union if these
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warheads are aimed at high value targets an incentive reinforced by the development of ABM systems 
which are likely to be effective more for point than for area protection 73
The United States the principal ally is o f course the major stumbling block The Reagan 
administration s unwavering commitment to the Strategic Defense Imtaüve (SDI) have elicited strong 
criticisms from officials in Britain and France In a speech on March 14 1985 British Foreign Secretary 
Sir Geoffrey Howe summarized many o f the points raised by critics o f the scheme that it potentially de 
stabilized the current deterrence system and hampered ongoing arms control efforts that the technological 
barriers to SDI especially its most ambitious claims o f civilian defense were very likely insuperable that 
SDI offered no protection against aircraft or cruise missiles battlefield nuclear weapons or covert action 74 
that political control might be lost as key parts o f the nuclear decisional process were automated that costs 
would run into many hundreds o f  billions o f dollars 75 that military opportunity costs measured by cuts 
in conventional arms might be prohibitive that an offensive and defensive arms race with the Soviets 
would be stimulated with resulting spiraling costs and risks and little or no gam in security that the ABM  
treaty would soon be violated if either side went much beyond basic research that m the end the American 
nuclear guarantee might itself be put m question if  allies shared the risk o f war and damage differentially 
and that insecurity and instability would result m the long transition penod toward creating a new security 
framework for the W est
Howe wondered whether SDI was worth i t  Other things being equal we welcome cost-effective 
enhancement o f deterrence to meet palpable weaknesses on the western side But we have to consider what 
might be the offsetting developments on the Soviet side if  unconstrained competition m ballistic missile 
defences beyond the ABM treaty limits were to be provoked In terms of NATO s policy o f forward defence 
and flexible response would we lose on the swings whatever might be gamed on the roundabouts9 76 
Pans had similar reservations In a presentation to the National Assembly Defense Minister Charles Hemu 
argued that superpower competition m developing defense systems against nuclear attack would prompt an 
arms race dismantle the space and ABM treaties sanctuanze the homelands o f the two superpowers at the 
expense o f U S alliance commitments and extended deterrence and accentuate the conventional imbalance 
in Europe 77 The Socialist government launched its own backfire in the form o f a civilian based space
28
program Eureka, partly to inhibit the U S campaign to gain support for SDI m Europe through
potentially lucrative defense contracts with European firms ^
American pressure and persistence over SDI have made Pans and London tacit allies o f the Soviet
Union m efforts to save the ABM treaty and to slow work on defensive systems In Howe s March speech
he contrasted Britain s preference for the existing deterrence regime and for arms control negotiations to
strengthen it, while lowering the size and cost o f nuclear weapons to President Reagan s alternative o f a
defense based security system beyond deterrence He held Washington to four conditions agreed to by the
President in his meeting with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at Camp David m December 1984
The U  S and western aim is not to achieve superiority but to maintain balance taking into 
account Soviet developments
SDI related deployment would in view o f treaty obligations have to be a matter o f  
negotiations
The over all aim is to enhance, not undercut, deterrence and
East West negotiations should aim to achieve security with reduced levels o f offensive 
systems on both sides ^9
These same conditions were reiterated by British Defense Minister Michael Hesseltine in justifying 
to Parliament the British government s signature o f contracts to assist m SDI research despite Howe s 
reservations ^  The upshot o f the British position is to hold SDI to a negotiated framework with the 
Soviet Union using its contracturai understanding with the United States m much the same way that the 
NATO two-track decision was calculated to influence U S arms control policy as well as its deployment of 
nuclear weapons m Europe
If American ABM policy can be controlled and channeled by Britain and its European allies one can 
envision British less so French participation in superpower negotiations to lower nuclear levels 
Indeed, the British French reservations about SDI ironically bolster the nuclear arms control process 
although both powers have resisted until now their entry into negotiations SDI is compelling them to 
address the issue o f preserving the multilateral deterrence system m which their nuclear forces and 
modernization plans have been cast For the British government, a Soviet U S arms accord on theatre 
nuclear weapons which would be consistent with constraints and conditions discussed earlier might well be 
attractive The Thatcher government faces a strong and rising tide o f opposition at home to the Trident
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decision Critical budgetary decisions about going ahead with Trident are scheduled for 1988 Labor is on 
record favoring cancellation of the system and unilateral nuclear disarmament81 The Liberal and Social 
Democratic Parties prefer active British negotiations m lowering nuclear weapons levels and strengthening 
the stability o f  nuclear deterrence through arms control negotiations 8^
What form these negotiations might take and what accord might flow from them is difficult to say 
France is not likely to participate in such talks All major parties in France oppose cuts m French 
capabilities and are suspicious o f being drawn into talks which would limit French strike forces and 
modernization plans There may not be major cause for alarm There are likely to be natural limits on 
French nuclear growth due to technological and economic restraints as well as to internal political pressures 
to hold the French defense budget down Britain is already on record m opting for lower warhead 
deployment on D  5 than the system is capable o f delivering to keep the British deterrent consistent with 
the original intentions for a force based on the Tndent C-4 missile system, 83 Additional British warhead 
reductions might be feasible if coupled with Soviet cuts say o f SS 20s and a U  S dismantling perhaps 
o f Pershing As which are exposed and subject to hair trigger use m a crisis because o f the incentives they 
generate for Soviet preemption Such a superpower course foreshadowed in the Nitze Kvitsinsky walk in 
the woods understanding might still be possible 8^ As long as the Nitze defined reservations o f  
feasibility survivability and cost effectiveness prevail in American policy circles as tests o f  SDI 
effectiveness restraints on ABM research are conceivable Pressures to cut defense spending m Congress 
will also slow work on SDI
Countervailing pressures may not be sufficient to stem, merely only to slow defense system  
development There may well be even a re negotiation o f the SALT I treaty to legitimate what the 
superpowers are already doing (e g the Soviet phased radar system at Krasnoyarsk and the U S systems 
being built m Greenland and Great Britain) and what is being projected for the future A British U S 
Soviet accord on theater wapons would still be useful It would not only bring Britain into the arms 
control process and strengthen both multilateral deterrence and arms control in its own right, but it would 
also assist in incorporating new defensive technologies into a negotiated nuclear environment, while
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avoiding the costs and risks o f a unilaterally defined nuclear regime—  a strain on alliance cohesion and a 
stimulant to a renewed and unregulated arms race
In the foreseeable future French cooperation cannot be expected either on such an arrangement or on 
participation m formal arms control negotiations A more indirect approach and more subtle incentives for 
cooperation w ill have to be developed by its allies and adversaries to draw France into a more stable 
deterrence network and into accepting —  even supporting as through its opposition to SDI and to the 
Soviet military build up —  an arms control regime Several routes may be available First, the long term 
viability o f the French system would be enhanced by access to American technology and C^I systems 
know how French air and missile defenses depend on NATO andU S systems France for example 
relies on the U  S Transit system of navigation satellites and U S naval navigation technology is 
employed by the French military The NADGE air network is important to French air defense U S KC 
135 tankers re fuel French strike aircraft Washington agreed to furnish new engmes for these tankers in 
1981 ^  and the Kevlar casmg material for the French M-4 missile system is made o f American 
matenals ^  Communication with French submannes would very likely be improved with access to U S 
technology Perhaps most cntical would be knowledge o f U S advances m ASW  and in improving 
France s capacity to avoid or defeat Soviet ASW forces to insure the invulnerability o f the French nuclear 
submanne fleet Whether the French would be prepared to share more knowledge about their nuclear 
systems and plans m return for U S help is problematic The record so far is far from encouraging But 
the costs o f remaining in the arms race mount and as the Gaullist hentage recedes future Pans governments 
may be more flexible on these counts
Another modestly promising line o f entanglement to draw France into alliance cooperation on 
nuclear planning may be through the prudent exploitation of twin fears at the surface o f French security 
concerns o f  U  S withdrawal or depreciation o f its conventional and nuclear commitments to the alliance 
and to European defense and o f a politically unmoored West Germany drifting toward neutralism These 
fears are implicitly expressed in France s resistance to SDI and MBFR negotiations and, conversely in its 
support for U S theatre nuclear deployments and in its insistence on Bonn s acceptance o f Pershing II and 
em ise missiles For much o f the Fifth Republic French strategic policy has been based on the
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contradictory stance o f  national independence and unilateral disposition and decision of French forces in 
meeting its interpretation o f alliance commitments and on its expectation o f access to the U S guarantee 
through the Washington Bonn London axis As the U S displays increasing unilateralist tendencies and 
withdrawal symptoms witnessed by SDI and gradual qualification o f SALT restrictions France may have 
to re think its empty chair approach Here the record is more encouraging if  France s increased willingness 
since the 1970s to cooperate m controlling nuclear proliferation is any indication 87
In the same way that Britain draws Washmgton to address Europe s concerns Bonn may prove to be 
France s bridge to Washmgton m inducing greater French cooperation m NATO especially in conventional 
defense Greater Pans Bonn military cooperation m evidence for over twenty years in weapons 
d e v e l o p m e n t , ^  will at once distance both from Washington m reinforcing continental dnft within the 
alliance and yet draw them are closer together m meeting to alliance needs by their mutual support for a 
stabler deterrent system than exists today for serious but flexible arms control negotiations and for the 
preservation of the gams and yet unrealized possibilities of the detente process institutionalized m the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation m Europe and m differentiated bilateral ties between Moscow and 
its East Europe clients with the West European states
■C.QflçlusiQns
The present size and projected growth of British and French nuclear forces m the 1990s pose serious 
security and arms control problems for the Soviet Umon and the United States Either European nuclear 
power can now very likely and with more certainty in the next decade inflict intolerable damage on the 
Soviet Union even after absorbing an initial attack on its society As allies o f the United States both have 
an increasing capacity to pursue strategies favorable to their preferred interests and values at the potential 
expense o f American aims The arms control implications o f the British and French nuclear systems can 
thus be understood m a context o f multilateral deteirence as the bargaining framework within which the two 
European nuclear powers can be expected to assume a role either m resisting integration o f their systems 
into the present arms control regime deriving essentially from SALT I and II or as appears progressively to
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be the case m working to preserve what remains o f these accords and the arms process from which they 
have flowed.
The parameters within which the two European systems are likely to be mt egrated within a SALT 
START Geneva arms control process are defined by the current and future composition o f  these forces the 
historic strategies pursued by these states in creating a desirable multilateral deterrent environment, and the 
domestic consensus on which their nuclear capabilities and strategies rest While both have adopted a 
posture o f minimum deterrence towards the Soviet Union each has followed contrasting strategies in its 
efforts to influence and inflect Amene an nuclear policies and practices the Bntish preferring to integrate 
their policies with those o f the United States within NATO the French to distance themselves from 
Washington within the Atlantic Alliance m order to maximimize both their mdependence and leverage over 
U S moves
In varying measure both Bntain and France share several prerequisites that w ill have to be met before 
they w ill consider participation in superpower arms control talks (1) substantial reductions m superpower 
offensive nuclear forces (2) superpower acceptance of Bntish and French forces as strategic weapons and 
superpower recognition o f a unitary Eurostrategic and superpower nuclear balance and the concomitant 
multilateralization o f the nsk o f nuclear war (3) substantial reductions m Soviet and Warsaw bloc 
conventional supenonty as well as (add the French) chemical and biological weapons and (4) no substantial 
change m superpower nuclear defense capabilities
Recent trends in superpower behavior —  away from a negotiated nuclear environment to a 
unilaterally defined framework —  are creating incentives for a re thinking of British and French pre 
conditions for arms control participation With the possibility o f significant improvements in superpower 
nuclear defensive capabilities London and Pans are prompted to review their empty chair positions and 
assume a more active role towards arms talks just to preserve rather than advance what remains o f the 
current ragged and refracted arms control regime haltingly and erratically defined by the superpowers smee 
the early 1970s and now under siege
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